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Is Russia a “Normal” Country? |
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a ‘riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma’
(Winston Churchill)
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‘With the mind alone, Russia cannot be understood. No
ordinary yardstick spans her greatness. She stands alone,
unique—In Russia one can only believe’ (Fyodor Tyutchev)
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according to normative Western yardsticks Russia is
not ‘normal’
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but if measured by the intrinsic logic of the
country’s own long-term development, Russia may be viewed as
‘normal’ (Stefan Hedlund)
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Breaking out of the Muscovite Mould |
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the objective conditions determining the direction of
state building amongst the early Russians were fundamentally
different from those that faced other Europeans (severe threats
to national security)
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under the Mongol onslaught the Muscovites had to
develop an institutional structure that was radically different
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there is no agreement on the subsequent consequences
of these early difficulties:
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Russia got off to a bad start, but subsequent developments
would follow a path similar to that of the other Europeans,
only with a lag
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the early difficulties contributed so powerfully to
Russian specificity that the country would remain different
from the rest of Europe well into the modern era, and
perhaps even into our times
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The ‘Lag Theory’ (Martin Malia) |
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Russia is in steady pursuit of Europe, being no more than 50
years behind
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beginning with Peter the Great, and compared to the
big powers in Europe, vital Russian transformations occurred
with a lag of half a century
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Soviet Russia represents both maximal divergence from
European norms and the great aberration in Russia’s own
development
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now that the Soviet system is gone, Russia is finally
back on track towards full integration into the West
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Continuity Theory (Path Dependency) |
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this theory seeks to locate Russia’s attempted
transition in the longer duration of Russian history
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the main features of the institutional matrix that
evolved in old Muscovy became path dependent
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the imperial ‘age of reform’ introduced far reaching
formal changes, but failed to achieve a transformation of
supporting norms
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the Soviet order was a reversal of those formal
changes, resulting in a full return to the Muscovite matrix
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the Yel’tsin era was as yet another ‘time of troubles’
(a short-term paralysis of the traditional matrix)
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under Vladimir Putin the traditional Russian ‘service
state’ was resurrected
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Russian history displays a fundamental pattern of
cyclical continuity
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